Is Greece a reforming economy? The purpose of this paper is to present the evolution and structure of the banking sector in Greece, with reference to the parallel experiences of the Eastern European (EE) countries. In Section 2, we are concerned with the domestic economic environment within which the Greek Banking System (GBS) operates. and the pressures building up within the system encouraging reform. In Section 3, we look into the evolution of the Greek Banking System, both in terms of structures and in terms of policy. Changes in the instruments of monetary policy are also considered in this section. In Section 4, we present the case of the Hellenic Industrial Development Bank, currently undergoing a thorough restructuring plan. In Section 5, we examine some of the main similarities and differences between Greece and the EE countries in relation to banking sector problems and reforms.
Introduction
Is Greece a reforming economy? This is the first question that needs to be asked when considering Greece as a parallel paradigm to that of the Eastern European countries.
Limiting ourselves to the Greek banking system, we would argue that there has indeed been considerable reform in the past ten years. This has largely been prompted by two factors: (1) the poor performance of the Greek economy following its accession to the European Economic Community in 1981; and (2) Traditionally, the public sector in Greece has held an important position in the economy, mainly through a complex system of checks and controls on economic activity and to a lesser extent through direct ownership. This is especially true of the banking sector, about twothirds of which is under state control. Such control is largely exercised through the stateinfluencing major bank shareholders, such as pension funds, public enterprises, etc.
The main features of the reform process of the Greek financial system include the following:
(i) a marked increase in the market shares of private banks; (ii) efforts to reduce public sector borrowing requirements, in order to limit the crowding-out effect these have on the financial system; (iii) the deregulation of the banking system, allowing for the integration of different market segments; (iv) the emergence of new financial institutions, such as mutual funds; and (v) the use of indirect means for monetary control.
The reform pattern of the Greek banking system bears certain similarities to that of Eastern European (EE) countries, insofar as this is becoming more clearly market-oriented. Hence, both the role of government and that of private agents is changing, as the influence of the former is being reduced, while that of the latter is gaining ground. Furthermore, the prospect of the EMU generates an urgency of adjustment in the Greek case, as does the prospect of accession to the EU in the case of the EE countries.
However, there is a major difference between the Greek case and that of the EE countries. This is that the Greek economy has always been organised along basically capitalist lines (private property-market operated, however imperfectly), as opposed to the centrally-planned economies. In this sense, it may be argued that the necessary political institutions are already in place, so that adjustment may be smoother and/or faster. On the other hand, by the same token, it would appear that the impetus for change in Greece may be less than that of the EE countries. Furthermore, since the process of change is less radical in the Greek case, various types of vested interest groups can be expected to play a more significant role in influencing the rate of change, usually slowing it down.
In actual fact, as we shall see, Greece has adopted a more gradual approach to restructuring its banking system than most EE countries. For example, the reform of the institutional framework, albeit thorough, has taken almost 7 years to complete , while the restructuring of state banks has been even slower. The reasons for this are politicaldisturbing as few vested interest groups as possible -as much as economic -concentrating on short-term macroeconomic management at the expense of long-term restructuring.
The purpose of this paper is to present the evolution and structure of the banking sector in Greece, with reference to the parallel experiences of the EE countries. It is organised as follows:
In Section 2, we are concerned with the domestic economic environment within which the Greek banking system (GBS) operates and the pressures building up within the system engendering reform. In Section 3, we look into the evolution of the Greek banking system, both in terms of structures and in terms of policy. Changes in the instruments of monetary policy are also considered in this section. In Section 4, we present the case of the Hellenic Industrial Development Bank, currently undergoing a thorough restructuring plan. In Section 5, we examine some of the main similarities and differences between Greece and the EE countries in relation to banking sector problems and reforms.
The Economic Environment of Greek Banking

Macroeconomic developments
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Greek economy grew at a great rate, while unemployment remained low, as did inflation. By the mid to late 70s, following the oil-price shocks of 1973 and 1978, growth slowed down while inflation started picking up. This was a time of technological innovation worldwide, aiming at introducing new, less oil-dependent methods of production. The availability of skilled labour and of adequate infrastructure was of great importance. Greece seemed to be lacking in both of these factors. Not surprisingly, investment slowed down considerably, bringing growth to a halt. At the same time, there was a noticeable increase in the public deficit and public debt, as demand-push policies were pursued, while supply-side incentives were not paid adequate attention. (Table 1 Greece's accession to the EEC in 1981 opened up the domestic market, creating increasing competition for Greek products both at home and abroad. Faced with this increased competition, the Greek economy has been consistently underperforming. In particular, Greek exports have failed to capture any considerable share of the EU markets, while imports from EU countries have made significant inroads into the domestic market. The prospect of the EMU is expected to intensify competitive pressures on the Greek economy and on enterprises in particular, placing many of them in serious financial trouble. In the past, the financial distress in which many companies found themselves was transmitted to the banking sector in due course, accounting for much of the current malaise of Greek banks. Hence, it is important that enterprises, indeed the economy as a whole, raise their level of competitiveness, for banks to be expected to operate soundly.
Enterprise restructuring in the 80s and 90s
The increased occurrence of enterprises in financial distress became apparent in the late 70s.
However, it was not until the mid-80s that the need for specific measures was recognised.
These originally involved the setting up of the Industrial Reconstruction Organisation (IRO) in 1984, charged with the task of taking over private enterprises in difficult financial conditions -many of them leaders of industry -in order either to restructure them or to have them liquidated. billion, i.e., more than three times the sale proceeds it achieved! Furthermore, 75% of total proceeds has been absorbed by liquidation expenses, 12% has been distributed among creditors and 13% kept for future (mainly legal) expenses. As a result, enterprise restructuring in the 80s ended up increasing the financial burden on banks as well as on the state budget.
Enterprise restructuring in the 90s largely consisted of a privatisation policy centering on special liquidation procedures, resulting in a fast winding down process and transfer of assets through public bids. The privatisation policy in force in the early 90s comprised 141 enterprises, of which 49 came under the IRO, 69 were state bank affiliates, and 23 belonged to the broader public sector. By the end of the 1990s, it is estimated that less than half of this programme has been implemented.
Generally, 'ailing' enterprises in Greece constitute a structural phenomenon, implying the inability of large sections of the Greek economy to adjust to changes in their environment.
This may be attributed to their overindebtedness, their failure to innovate technologically and the lack of a long-term development perspective and corresponding measures in government policy. The implications for banks -mainly of state ownership or control -have been farreaching, as a growing amount of bad debt has been accumulating, the precise estimate of which remains unknown. It is only as banks write-off part of this debt and/or setup high provisions accounts, or indeed recapitalise, that the extent of the bad debt problem in the Greek economy is being revealed.
The Greek Banking System -Evolution and Structure
The banking system in Greece was never a monobank one. On the contrary, in addition to the central bank, the Bank of Greece, there has always been a large number of banks, 40-50 throughout the post-war period, with many foreign ones amongst them. On the other hand, state ownership and control has traditionally been pervasive. This is still evident today, even though it has been eroding over time.
In this sense, bank restructuring in Greece does not entail the break-up of a monobank system into two tiers, as it did in the transition countries. Rather, it entails the acceleration of the transformation process of the financial sector, so as to meet the standards of international competition and to accommodate growth in investment flows.
In this section, we examine the structure of the Greek banking system (GBS) and the changes brought about in the 80s and 90s, highlighting the role and shares of state banks (3.1). We look into loan concentration and its implications for market segmentation. The question of public sector borrowing requirements (PSBR) crowding out private borrowing is also considered (3.2). The policy reforms introduced into the banking system in the late 80s and early 90s, including prudential surveillance regulations as well as new instruments of monetary policy, are presented (3.3). Finally, the section ends with a discussion of the evolution and especially the internationalisation of the Greek banking system and the ongoing bank restructuring efforts (3.4).
Banks in Greece: Number, size, performance, ownership
The banks operating in Greece can be grouped into four categories: (1) commercial banks; (2) specialised credit institutions; (3) cooperative banks; and (4) branches of foreign banks. A detailed list is provided in the Appendix. In addition to these, there is the Bank of Greece, which acts as a central bank, mainly responsible for the implementation of monetary policy.
1. Commercial banks. These have traditionally been the dominant group in the GBS.
There are 20 of them, classified into three groups, according to their ownership status:
• 9 owned or controlled by the state. More specifically, the presence of the state is felt in these banks either through direct ownership, or through the indirect exertion of government control. For example, the state owns only 5.18% of the capital of the In terms of size and ownership/control, the GBS features a small number of large stateowned/controlled banks, followed by a number of medium-sized private Greek banks, which have been growing at a fast rate, while an increasing number of foreign banks are setting up branches in Greece. Although the market shares of state-owned/controlled banks have been decreasing over time, their position in the GBS remains dominant, lending it its oligopolistic nature. Table 3 shows the structure of the GBS at two points in time, in 1980 and in 1993. As can be seen, there has been a gradual shift away from public banks to private ones. Thus, between 1980-93, the share of the state-controlled banks in total deposits fell from 87.3% to 78.9%, while that of private banks rose from 12.7% to 21.1%, and that of foreign banks from 6.8% to 8%. Similar trends can be discerned in other areas, such as the structure of assets, of loans and of government securities (see also Figure 1 ). 
Source: OECD 1994-95 Country Annual Review
The dominance of state controlled banks in the GBS can be seen even more clearly in relation to individual banks. In particular, the National Bank of Greece stands out for its high share of assets, deposits and loans, followed by the Agricultural Bank and the Commercial Bank, as can be seen in Table 4 . These three state banks account for 63% of all bank branches and for 54% of all bank employees, while the National Bank of Greece alone accounts for 25% and 29% of the total, respectively. On the other hand, smaller private banks, such as the Credit Bank and Ergobank, are steadily gaining ground. Overall, state banks continue to dominate the banking sector in Greece, as they do in many countries in transition. However, increasing competition is eroding their shares and role, while the presence of private ones is increasing on a flow basis. This is a phenomenon also observed in EE countries. In this sense, the GBS appears to be evolving along gradualist lines, an approach already adopted by many EE countries.
The increasingly stronger position of private banks, in relation to state ones, can further be seen in their comparatively better performance rates, shown in Table 5 . Source: The difference in the performance rates between the state and the private banking sector is due to the higher operating costs of the former, as well as the greater incidence of nonperforming loans, which accumulated in the 80s.
It is worth noting that there are no estimates of the existing stock of bad debt in the GBS and especially in the large state banks. It is only as these write-off debt and recapitalise that the existence of bad debt is acknowledged. Hence, the extent to which the existing bad debt is a 'stock', created by unsuccessful policies in the past, or a 'flow', indicating problems in the current operation of banks, is a question that cannot be readily answered. However, the persistence of certain weaknesses in the operation of the GBS point to the existence of a flow problem. Such weaknesses include bureaucratic decision-making, inadequate credit appraisal methods, poor flow of internal information and, until a few years ago, lack of a clearing house. In addition, politically-determined lending is not uncommon, even if difficult to prove.
Furthermore, the fact that the GBS displays one of the largest interest rate spreads in the EU, as well as in comparison to the EE countries, points to the existence of debt not being serviced (non performing debt, bad debt, etc.). More specifically, the difference between loan and deposit rates (adjusted for inflation) currently stands at 9% in Greece, in contrast to the 2-3 percent range more commonly found in the EU and 5-9 percent in the EE countries (World Bank, 1996) . In this way, banks in trouble recapitalise at the expense of borrowers, while high profit rates are recorded by most other (mainly private) banks. The figures shown in Table 5 above would appear to validate such a hypothesis.
Loan concentration
Loan concentration by sector, type of borrower, etc, associated with a particular bank, signifies the existence of some measure of market segmentation, to the extent that the lender (bank) acquires certain market place advantages due to its size, access to deposits, traditional client base, etc. In Greece, as in the EE countries, this is true of the large state banks, which have in the past specialised in particular credit areas, such as agriculture, small scale industry, etc. However, different market segments have tended to integrate in more recent years, as a result of the deregulation of the banking system.
Lending to the private sector currently presents the following features:
• Households absorb approximately 25-35% of the total. This is high in relation to EE countries, largely explained by the large share of mortgage loans, which account for about two-thirds of the total, while the remaining one-third concerns short and medium term consumer loans. Mortgages have until recently been granted by specialised state banks.
Even today, the bulk of mortgage loans is granted by one bank, classified until recently as a Special Credit Institution.
• Agricultural loans amount to 7-8%, again a preserve of a former Special Credit Institution, the Agricultural Bank of Greece, which still accounts for the greatest part of agricultural credit. This is a situation common to many EE countries.
• The remaining 57-68% of loans to the private sector are granted to enterprises. Although the state banks tend to have the lion's share, private domestic and foreign banks attract the upper echelon of corporate clients.
Another form of market segmentation concerns the high public sector borrowing requirements (PSBR), which result in the crowding out of private borrowers by the state.
This is a phenomenon met not only in the GBS, but also in many EE countries. In the past few years, efforts have been made to reduce the rate of PSBR, especially as membership of the EMU allows a maximum rate of 3% of GDP. In fact, PSBR have declined from 11.4% of GDP in 1993 to 5.9% in 1997. In addition, public debt has declined from over 120% of GDP in the early 90s to 110% in 1997. This is still high in relation to the EU, as well as the EE countries. The crowding out of private credit by the public sector, based on a system of differing interest and tax rates, implies that banks have a preference for government securities, which represent a safer method of recapitalisation.
The same type of risk averse behaviour is evident in the banks' preference for short-term over long-term credit. For example, short-term lending was equal to 54.4% of total lending to the private sector in 1997, 68.6% in 1996 and 65.8% in 1995. In this respect, the Greek experience is comparable to that of the EE countries.
Overall, the GBS appears to be relatively segmented, with the public sector crowding-out the private one. Phenomena of this kind are also common in many EE countries, although perhaps of a greater intensity in view of the different historical background in each case.
Banking policy reform -Prudential surveillance -Monetary policy
Until the mid-80s, the Greek banking system was characterised by a pervasive network of regulations aimed at channelling funds to selected sectors. These regulations included interest rate controls on most financial instruments, restrictions on the composition of financial institutions' balance sheets, line of business regulations and international capital controls.
More specifically, up to 1987, 75% of deposits with commercial banks were earmarked for loans to 'privileged borrowers' (obligatory investment ratios). This included primarily the public sector, which was entitled to receive loans equal to 48.5% of deposits in 1985, to 56% in 1987 and to 56.5% in 1989. Small-scale firms were entitled to 10% of deposits in 1985, while 15% of deposits were designated to long-term loans to industry.
In addition to high obligatory investment ratios in the pre-reform era, interest rates were fixed administratively until 1987. Thus, those pertaining to the obligatory investments were negative in real terms, as were interest rates on agricultural loans, while the implicit interest rate subsidy was estimated at about 1.5% of GDP in 1988. Interest rates on loans to farmers by the Agricultural Bank were subsidised. The cost of the privileged credit was borne by depositors and by non-privileged borrowers, while a complex system of compulsory reserves and withdrawals aimed at equalising banks' rates of return on different categories of loans.
Furthermore, the differences in loan rates paid by preferred and ordinary borrowers created a need for quantitative controls on lending designed to prevent banks from shifting toward ordinary borrowers paying higher rates.
Yet another type of market intervention related to the 'special credit institutions' (SCIs), which were subject to restrictions relating to the types and terms of lending they were allowed to undertake, while prior approval was often needed for the provision of many types of financial services by them.
Lastly, foreign exchange controls were extensive, although not effective, in view of the fact that an informal foreign exchange market flourished. The division between commercial banks and SCIs was thoroughly dismantled in the early 1990s. Thus, in 1991 mortgage banks were allowed to open current deposit accounts, development banks to accept drachma deposits and to grant loans for working capital and the Agricultural Bank to give the same types of loans as commercial banks.
Lastly, financial liberalisation was accompanied by the lifting of foreign exchange controls. By May 1994, these had been abolished completely.
Prudential surveillance
For the transition from a highly regulated to a market-based system to be successful, it is important that the banks regulatory framework is strengthened. In the pre-reform era, prudential arrangements were weak, as it was felt that an all-pervasive system of rules and controls made the need for such arrangements superfluous. In fact, many new regulations were adopted in 1992, the most important of which are the following:
• The minimum capital for the creation of banks was raised to more than twice the amount fixed by the second banking directive of the EU.
• The solvency ratio was fixed at 8 per cent. This ratio applied to all banks with the exception of the Agricultural Bank, for which a transition period until 1999 has been provided. The Hellenic Industrial Development Bank (ETBA) is also exempt.
• The ceiling in relation to own capital for banks' qualifying equity participation in all non-financial companies was fixed at 60 per cent of own capital and, in a single firm, at 15 per cent.
• The large exposure directive, limiting the size of loans to individual firms and groups of firms and requiring banks to report them to the supervisory authority, was introduced in
1993.
• Banks were prohibited from accruing interest on loans not serviced for more than 12 months and from granting new loans to finance overdue interest.
• The primary reserve requirement was fixed at 9 per cent. Half of this is non-interest bearing, while the other half carries a 12.5 per cent interest rate.
Prudential supervision for most banks is the responsibility of the central bank, the Bank of Greece, which keeps a close watch on the banks' liquidity situation and on their foreign exchange operations, so as to assess their short-term situation and future trends.
Monetary policy
In addition to banking policy reform, monetary policy has ceased to be a passive exercise of allocating cheap credit to preferred public and private borrowers, while new tools of monetary management have been introduced. Furthermore, in 1997 a law was passed through parliament granting the Bank of Greece its independence from central government, as required by the EMU rules, and thus strengthening its role in the formulation and implementation of monetary policy. The main concern of the Bank of Greece nowadays is to influence short-term interest rates on the interbank market, in order to stabilize the interbank rate.
One important implication of the monetary policy followed over the past ten years for the banking system should however be noted. This is the 'hard currency' policy adopted by successive governments as a means of fighting inflation. The support lent to the exchange rate of the Greek drachma has meant that Greece has maintained over a long period of time literally the highest interest rates in the EU. In this sense, although the new tools of monetary policy are indirect, the linkages between it and the banking system remain strong.
The evolution of the GBS
The major driving force behind economic change in the post-war period has been the internationalisation of capital -its free movement across countries -leading on to the globalisation of markets -the creation of single market conditions on a scale approaching the world! Against this general background, the internationalisation of the banking system in Greece in the post war period has been steady if slow.
During this time (early 60s to mid-80s), 18 foreign banks, mostly of US origin, were established in the country, with a total of 42 branches, accounting for approximately 10% of bank activity (deposits and loans), mainly in the area of commercial banking. The presence of foreign banks resulted in market segmentation, as these concentrated on the provision of new financial products, hitherto unknown to the Greek market, focusing on corporate clients, leaving the more traditional type of banking services to the Greek banks.
During the same period, Greek banks expanded abroad only slightly, while any such activities were closely related to the transfer of foreign exchange remittances of Greek emigrants to Greece and to the financing of Greek shipping. Thus, Greek bank branches were set up in Germany, the UK and the US.
Overall, till the mid-80s, the structure of the Greek banking system remained strongly oligopolistic, dominated by a small number of large, state banks. However, the process of change had already set in. This became accelerated by the deregulation of the institutional framework to take place in the late 80s, while it was also spurred on by the far reaching technological developments in the financial services sector.
Since the mid-80s, the banking system has undergone a number of major changes, allowing for new concerns, new products and new strategies to appear. New financial activities, such as leasing, factoring, mutual funds, venture capital, financial consulting and investment banking have developed. Furthermore, along with the state-owned or controlled banks increasing their share of earnings from fees and other sources, new financial institutions have emerged. These include a growing securities market and its associated distribution channels, such as mutual funds.
In particular, the assets of mutual funds rose from 1% of GDP in 1990 to over 5% in 1995, while the Athens Stock Exchange is expanding its role in Greek corporate finance, as equity capitalisation has grown from 6.8% of GDP in 1980 to 17.1% in 1992, while total capitalisation (incl. equities and bonds) has risen from 8.8% of GDP to 67.1% over the same period.
Not surprisingly, foreign banks have become interested in retail banking, an area reserved to Greek banks in the past. Furthermore, Greek banks are expanding in the Balkan region.
Currently, 10 Greek banks own, or part own, 14 subsidiaries or branches in Bulgaria, Albania, Romania and FYROM, pursuing a policy of capturing a share of the emerging markets, as well as catering for Greek businesses investing in these countries.
Overall, the GBS, and especially the large state-owned or controlled banks, are under strong competitive pressures. Bank restructuring, however, appears to be happening at a slow rate.
For example, the National Bank of Greece, the largest commercial bank in Greece, displayed a dangerously low solvency ratio of 1.43% in 1988, so that by 1990 its recapitalisation became necessary. This took the form of an equity-bond swap, as the Bank was given 3-year state bonds, to be changed into equity at a later stage. Even today, the National Bank is making a great effort to restructure its portfolio and to recapitalise.
In the same way, the Agricultural Bank of Greece has been recapitalised more than once since 1990. So has the Hellenic Industrial Development Bank (ETBA), which is currently undergoing a 5-year restructuring programme. The Commercial Bank is considering selling its 60% stake in the Ionian Bank in order to increase its own capital resources. Similarly, efforts are being made to privatize a number of smaller banks, such as the Creta Bank and the Bank of Central Greece, which were obtained by the state relatively recently by way of salvaging them.
Generally, it may be argued that the GBS has embarked on a course of extensive, albeit gradual restructuring. In view of the fact that most of the required legal framework is in place, the main difficulty at present seems to be one of designing and implementing a comprehensive, as well as coherent restructuring plan that will span a period of time and will carry the consent of all the social groups concerned.
In the next section, we present the case of the Hellenic Industrial Development Bank, known as 'ETBA' by its Greek initials, currently undergoing a thorough restructuring plan. This is of special interest, as it bears a number of similarities both to bank operation and to bank restructuring efforts in many EE countries.
Firstly, ETBA is a totally state-owned and controlled bank. This is as close as one can get to 'monolithic' banking in the Greek case. A direct implication of this has been, for example, the rudimentary credit appraisal and accounting methods employed, which have tended to disguise the financial problems of the bank and especially the extent of its bad-debt problem.
Secondly, it was set up with the express aim of furthering government policy -in terms of both formulation and implementation -in the industrial and in the tourist sectors. However, the bank's loan concentration in these two sectors has made it especially vulnerable to changing economic conditions as well as government policy. Thirdly, the bank's vulnerability was intensified by its limited resource base and by its dependence on the state for its recapitalisation. Thus, the adoption of stringent monetary policies by the government in the 90s caused serious liquidity problems to ETBA. Lastly, but equally importantly, ETBA has traditionally operated in close co-ordination to government decision-making, allowing for political intervention, or the 'politicisation' of banking.
The Hellenic Industrial Development Bank S.A.
The Hellenic Industrial Development Bank S.A., is one of three Greek investment banks set up in the early 60s, with the express aim of providing long-term credit and other related services to enterprises in order to foster growth in a relatively less developed country, such as Greece was at the time. ETBA has traditionally been the largest of the three investment banks, accounting for over 85% of assets and 90% of loans of all three banks in 1992, as opposed to 13% and 8% respectively accounted for by 'Investment Bank' and 2% by ETEBA. During the same period, ETBA's share of the total assets of the Greek banking system amounted to 5% and its share of the total loans to 7%.
More recently, the changing economic and institutional environment has led to a deterioration in the position of two out of the three investment banks, so that only ETEBA continues to operate normally today. In particular, in 1994, 'Investment Bank' was absorbed by its parent organisation, the Commercial Bank, while ETBA was placed on a rigorous five-year restructuring programme passed through Parliament and starting in 1995 (Law 2359/95).
In this section, we examine the case of the Hellenic Industrial Development Bank, or 'ETBA' in some detail. More specifically, we begin by outlining its profile: -statutory objectives (4.1), sources of finance (4.2), lending operations (4.3), participation in equity capital (4.4) , financial position and performance (4.5) . We then present the ETBA Restructuring Plan (4.6) and its interim results (4.7). The section ends with a discussion of the ETBA experience in the context of state paternalism, a concept first developed in relation to EE countries (Schaffer, 1998 ).
Statutory objectives
The Hellenic Industrial Development Bank (ETBA) was founded in 1964, originating from a merger between three state organisations, the Industrial Development Organization, the Economic Development Financing Organisation and the Tourist Credit Organisation. In 1973, it became a joint-stock company (S.A.) owned by the state. Until the early 90s it was a Special Credit Institution. In this sense, it was subject to various restrictions regarding its operations. These restrictions have since been lifted, as part of the deregulation of the banking system. ETBA's statutory aims include the promotion of industrial and tourist development and the provision of technical and financial support to enterprises. Its range of operations include a multiplicity of fields:
• acceptance of cash deposits, in drachma and foreign exchange;
• foreign currency transactions;
• discounting, rediscounting and redemption on behalf of third parties (on a commission basis) of promissory notes, bills and in general of all types of credit, titles and securities;
• partial or full participation in the equity capital of new or existing joint-stock companies; • underwriting;
• foreign trade financing and issuing of letters of credit and guarantee;
• undertaking Public Investment Programme projects;
• setting and operating industrial estates;
• providing financial advisory services;
• monitoring Community programmes of all kinds.
The above list of statutory aims is a broad one. This may be seen as an advantage, to the extent that it allows for cross-selling to be pursued or a disadvantage, to the extent that it may result in a lack of focus in terms of strategy. In the case of ETBA, it is the latter aspect that seems to have prevailed.
Sources of finance
Until the mid-70s, the state was the main source of ETBA financing, accounting for 48.9% of its total capital resources in 1977. By 1991, its share fell to 0.1% (Table 6 ). In 1975, the ETBA bond -a new financial instrument -was introduced. This soon became its main source of finance, increasing from 12% of total capital resources in 1977 to almost 60% in 1989. The interest rate payable by the ETBA bond was subsidised by the state at the rate of 2-5.5%, while the total amount of subsidy received by the Bank over the period 1975-86 from the government budget was equal to approximately 43% of total bond interest payments.
In the late 80s, the ETBA bond came under strong competitive pressure from government bonds, which were sold directly to the public for the first time in 1987. Furthermore, following the liberalisation of the Greek banking system, not only did the subsidy cease, but also the ETBA bond became subject to taxation at 10% in 1991 and at 15% as from 1992, whereas the government bond became taxable only recently (1997) at 7.5%. Thus, the interest rate on the ETBA bond had to be raised by 2.5-3% in order to counteract the effect of taxation, thus putting a strain on the Bank's finances.
Borrowing from abroad was originally rather limited, accounting for 4% of total capital resources in 1977. This was increased to over 25% by the late 80s and early 90s, so that it currently constitutes an important source of finance. However, ETBA's financial troubles have meant a fall in its credit rating abroad, making it more difficult for it to apply to international markets for funds.
A major criticism directed at the state, as the sole owner of ETBA, has to do with the low share of the bank's own capital resources, at a time when the Bank was called upon to undertake lending of a very precarious nature. More particularly, the Bank's own capital resources fell from 35% of its total resources in 1975, to 12% in 1989. Capital injections by the state amounting to Drs. 100 billion and Drs. 200 billion in 1992 and 1993 respectively led to a temporary rise in the share of own capital. This was wiped out by 1994, as equivalent amounts of bad debt were written off. 2 Overall, developments in terms of financing in the 80s put ETBA under considerable strain, as the share of its own capital resources fell rapidly, while alternative sources of finance were not forthcoming.
Lending operations
ETBA lends to both the public and the private sector. Furthermore, since 1986, it also lends to the Armed Forces, which in fact absorbed 36% of its total loans in 1993 and 38% in 1994.
These are state guaranteed loans, bearing a relatively low interest rate, equal to that of annual government bonds. For example, this is currently set at 10.3%, as compared with an interest rate of 13.75% on long -term loans.
With regard to the private sector, ETBA has traditionally supplied long-term credit to industry, tourism and shipping, in two ways; (i) through lending; and (ii) through the acquisition of equity capital in various concerns. In 1993-94, ETBA's share of the market for long-term loans was estimated at 35%. The structure of its portfolio is shown in Table 7 . Industry, followed by tourism, are the main sectors financed by ETBA. With regard to the regional distribution of ETBA loans, there is a concentration in Northern Greece, which absorbed 36% of total funds in 1994, followed by Attica (26%), the Islands (27%), Peloponnese (7%) and Central Greece (4%).
Generally, ETBA lending to industry has been closely linked with the government's development policy and relevant laws. In practice, this has meant that ETBA acts as a 'lender of last resort'. That is, it tends to supply credit where other banks may be reluctant to. In this way, the Bank has become increasingly exposed to risky, largely unprofitable lending.
This tendency is exacerbated by the fact that ETBA provides financing for long term rather than operating capital needs, as well as the fact that the interest rate on long-term loans is lower than that on short-term ones, according to Greek banking practices.
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In the 80s, ETBA was called upon to finance the government's enterprise restructuring policy. This meant a rapid increase in precarious lending. Thus, between 1981-89, the volume of loans granted increased more than fivefold, while the actual figure was further inflated by the fact that interest continued to accumulate even where loans were no longer being serviced, largely due to the accounting methods employed by ETBA. 4 It is estimated that the losses incurred due to ETBA's financing of enterprises in distress amounted to Drs. 250 billion, approximately 1% of GDP or 18% of its assets in 1994, as quoted in the Submission to Parliament Report accompanying Law 2359/95, regarding the ETBA restructuring programme.
Hence, it may be argued that an increasing amount of 'quasi-flow' of bad debt has been building up, the extent of which was revealed only later, as the need for government intervention became obvious. More specifically, it is estimated that in 1995, at the time of the Bank's entering a restructuring phase, only 11% of ETBA loans were being regularly serviced, while a further 9% were state guaranteed. Loans amounting to 8% of the total displayed a delay of more than two instalments (i.e., they had not been paid up for over a year) but were still interest-bearing. In addition, 65% of all loans were not being serviced, while a further 7% were believed to be only partially recoverable. It is interesting to note that 50 large enterprises owed a total of Drs. 160 billion (31/12/1995), i.e. 46% of all outstanding debt, accentuating ETBA' s vulnerability in terms of loan concentration.
Participation in equity capital
ETBA's support to economic development was further implemented through its acquiring equity capital in various concerns singled out by government policy as instrumental to the development effort. In 1974, ETBA was a shareholder in 48 companies, while by 1994 the ETBA group consisted of 134 companies. ETBA's equity portfolio between 1974 and 1994 is shown in Table 8 . As can be seen, between 1984-89 ETBA's equity portfolio rose nearly fourfold, as it did over the previous ten years . This led to a rise in equity in relation to total assets, as well as in relation to loans. As mentioned above, this was largely the result of the government's enterprise restructuring policy of the 80s, during which much of the outstanding debt was turned into equity. In particular, the outstanding debt towards ETBA of 11 companies, placed under the Industrial Restructuring Organisation according to Law 1386/83 was capitalised.
This involved an amount equal to Drs. 7.4 billion, equal to nearly two-thirds of the Bank's share capital at the time.
Financial position and performance rates
The lending and equity policies followed by ETBA in the 80s led to a fast deterioration of its financial position. More specifically, the rapid rise in loans and equity was not matched by an equivalent increase in its own capital resources, while the Bank came to rely heavily on the ETBA bond, thus becoming especially vulnerable to changes in its economic and institutional environment. These adverse factors showed up in ETBA's financial position, as shown in Table 9 . Source: ) & 1994 In the 90s, ETBA became a heavy loss-maker. In particular, it recorded losses of the order of Dr. 128 billion in 1993 and Dr. 94 billion in 1994, amounts approaching, in fact, the total profit made by all commercial banks in those years. Also, in 1994 accumulated losses from previous years, amounting to Dr. 240.5 billion were written off.
The ETBA Restructuring Plan
In 1992 and 1993, ETBA was recapitalised by the amounts of Dr. 100 billion and Dr. 200 billion respectively. Its financial position however continued to worsen. In November 1995, Law 2359/95 was passed through parliament, according to which an amount of almost half a trillion drachmae (Dr. 492 billion, or 2% of GDP) was to be handed over to ETBA over a 5-year period, 1995-99, to Operationally, the ETBA RP is based on the "Good Bank-Bad Bank" concept. That is, the Bank has been divided into two separate administrative units: Unit I dealing with outstanding debts of all kinds (work-out unit) and Unit II dealing with the restructuring of the Bank's activities and portfolio.
More specifically, Unit I, dealing with the Bank's problematic portfolio, has been 'endowed'
with assets acquired through auctions, non-performing loans and the Bank's holding in 'ailing' enterprises. By the end of the restructuring period (1999), it is expected that the Bank's total assets will have been reduced to less than half their current nominal value (Dr.
523 billion, as compared with Dr. 1,383 billion, in 1994) , through the liquidation of all problematic loans and other related assets.
Unit II, on the other hand, has been made responsible for the granting of loans to the private sector and to the armed forces, for the management of ETBA industrial estates, for policy towards small and medium-sized enterprises, for the management of government stock and for developing new areas of activity, as well as for looking after the Bank's interests in its various financial subsidiaries.
From the point of view of organisational restructuring, a 25% reduction in personnel (200 out of 800 employees) is being sought over a 5-year period. A special incentives system has been set up in this respect. In fact, one month after the publication of the law, 180 applications were submitted, indicating that the incentive system offered was attractive (!). It is worth noting that 140 applications were for early retirement.
The Bank's operational structure is also to be redesigned. In particular, a reduction in the number of divisions is contemplated, while the number of members of the Board of Directors is to be reduced from 15 to 9, with a three year period of service. Of these, 2 are to be employee representatives directly elected by the employees, instead of 1, as was previously the case.
The implementation of the RP is being monitored by the Bank of Greece, while annual reports have to be submitted to the Ministries of National Economy, Finance and Development.
Lastly, it is interesting to note that a system of incentives is 'built' into the rescue plan.
Accordingly, if actual results are below expected results, the following financial hand-out is given only after corrective measures are taken. If actual results, on the other hand, exceed those expected, then the next financial hand-out is reduced by an equivalent amount. As it might be expected, the actual hand-outs have not so far fallen short of the amounts envisaged in the original RP.
1995-97: Interim results of the ETBA Restructuring Plan
Although it is still early for a full assessment of the ETBA Restructuring Plan, a review of results so far is useful, to the extent that possible weaknesses may already be pointed out.
More specifically, the implementation of the ETBA RP has so far included the following developments.
1. The Bank has been divided into two units, mainly in terms of accounting. Unit I, the 'Bad Bank' has already made its presence felt through the extensive restructuring of ETBA's portfolio. Unit II, however, the 'Good Bank', has not so far made an impression, to the extent that the ETBA share of the market has dwindled considerably, while no new business initiatives are forthcoming.
2. An extensive loan rescheduling programme was announced in January 1996, available on application. More specifically, it was announced that non-performing loans amounting to a total of Dr. 677 billion (i.e., approximately half of its assets) were to be rescheduled, corresponding to 1,500 customers. Rescheduling was made available on application, which had to be submitted until 31. 5.1996 . Enterprises wishing to take advantage of the rescheduling arrangements were asked to deposit an amount equal to 5% of their outstanding debt until 30.6.1996. In fact, 75% of eligible debtors applied for rescheduling.
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It is worth noting that fears have been expressed by ETBA's financial advisers (charged with monitoring the RP) that the loan rescheduling plan may give rise to a moral hazard problem. In particular, by being generally applicable, it may give the impression that the Bank is adopting a 'soft' approach. Also, the fact that similar types of rescheduling policies have been announced in the past may lead to the conclusion that the repayment of loans is at the discretion of debtors. Thus, a case-by-case approach has been advocated as more suitable, as it tends to reinforce bank-client relationships and have a longer lasting effect.
3. More than 50% of outstanding debt has been written off as bad, corresponding to Drs.
374 billion, in nominal terms. This is higher than the percentage originally envisaged, which stood at 35%.
4.
A treasury division has been set up to manage government bonds. Furthermore, the Bank has utilised short-term borrowing, acquired from deposits and on the interbank market, to pay off most ETBA outstanding bonds, considered to be a costly source of income.
New issues are in fact available at a lower interest rate, to the extent that the tax payable is transferred to bond buyers. Overall, ETBA appears to have been cleaning up its balance sheet quite effectively. Thus, its net worth increased from 4% of assets in 1994 to almost 12% in 1997. The question that needs to be asked however is whether this improvement represents a new beginning or whether it is temporary. Should changes be interpreted in a static or in a dynamic way? Even more importantly, have the factors that brought ETBA near insolvency been worked out of its system? The answers to such questions are crucial. Some speculation is attempted in the next section.
ETBA restructuring and state 'paternalism'
ETBA was set up in the sixties, when the idea of 'nurturing champions' was current amongst economists and policy-makers alike. Its role in the development of industry in Greece is undoubted. However, by the late 80s, the Greek government was looking for ways to deal with the growing number of enterprises in financial distress. The banking system provided the solution and state-owned ETBA a particularly useful means of policy. As a result, however, ETBA soon became a bank in heavy financial trouble. A bail-out was necessary, to avoid complete failure of the bank. While the prospect of the bank's failing recedes, however, that of its restructuring requires urgent action, especially as the end year of the restructuring plan, 1999, is approaching.
To begin with, the bail out of ETBA may be seen as a case of 'state paternalism', dictated by the political and social cost of the bank's failing. In particular, given ETBA's long-standing in the international capital markets, closing it was considered to have a direct bearing on the country's international credit-worthiness. Furthermore, no government is prepared to undertake the political cost of closing down an 'industrial development bank', thus seemingly depriving its policy of its development perspective and itself of a potentially useful instrument of intervention. Lastly, shutting down ETBA would increase unemployment both directlyabout 1,000 ETBA employees would become jobless -and indirectly, through the filtering effect of ETBA's closure on its clients, many of which are large industrial concerns, at a time when unemployment in Greece is on the ascent, averaging more than 10% of the labour force.
For restructuring to be successful, however, extensive government interference must be perceived to be receding. Developments so far are not clear in that respect. This is due to the fact that; (a) the bank's future role remains to be defined, while its market shares are dwindling fast; (b) its lending operations are still closely linked to government supported investment schemes, entailing long bureaucratic delays, as well as possible politicisation of lending; and (c) government involvement in the bank's decision-making is still evident.
ETBA is expected to become a universal, commercial bank and to float its shares on the Athens Stock Exchange at some later date. However, as noted above, the restructuring that has taken place so far has mainly involved balance sheet cleaning up, while no initiatives have been forthcoming in the area of banking operations. On the contrary, ETBA has adopted a 'defensive' stand, to the extent that it has limited the volume of its lending operations, while trying to hold on to a small number of good clients. Furthermore, ETBA' s equity participation portfolio is being reshaped largely by the government, pointing to past practices of government intervention. Similarly, the Bank's system of internal procedures is in urgent need of improvement and speeding up.
Overall, the future role and strategy of ETBA needs to be explicitly defined while certain features of its everyday operations will have to be improved, for restructuring to have any viable effects. In other words, the success of recapitalisation and of the sectioning-off of bad debts depends on the long-term ability of ETBA to increase its capital and reserves from operations, while avoiding the recurrence of a bad debt problem, in terms of flow. In this sense, it is imperative that the new Bank profile is moulded and put into effect as soon as possible.
What happens should the ETBA RP fail? Does the state carry on funding loss-producing operations in the name of state 'paternalism'? Or, alternatively, does ETBA give up being a bank and turn into a government development agency?
Generally, it would appear that if the present ETBA RP fails to produce long-term results, the pressure for more radical measures will mount. Furthermore, any failure in the case of ETBA might have wider repercussions, as it might be interpreted as the failure of government-led restructuring in the banking area.
Bank Restructuring in Greece and in the Eastern European Countries: Comparing Notes
In this paper we have presented the main elements of the reform process the Greek banking system is currently undergoing. We have pointed out the fact that such reform has not entailed the break-up of a monobank system, as it has done in the EE countries. Rather, it has entailed the thorough deregulation of the financial sector and the gradual erosion of the presence and role of the state, both in terms of controlling and in terms of using up banking resources. The case of the ETBA is a useful illustration of widespread state intervention in banking and of current restructuring efforts.
We have also argued that the very existence of capitalist institutions -however imperfect -at the start of the reform process has tended to reduce the impetus for change in the Greek case.
This is due to the fact that the restructuring effort required is not perceived to be as radical as in the EE countries. Also, there are strong vested interest groups resisting such change, mainly through fear of widespread job cuts. Lastly, Greek public opinion is either divided or hostile to restructuring and to privatisation in particular, as opposed to the EE countries, where there is greater support for radical restructuring schemes.
On the other hand, there are many interesting similarities between bank reforms in Greece and in the EE countries. Notably, both sets of countries aim at accelerating the transformation of their financial sectors, in order to deal with increased international competition. In both instances, private banks have been gaining ground on a flow basis, as powerful state banks remain dominant. For example, state banks routinely account for over two-thirds of the banking activities in both EE countries and in Greece (World Bank, 1996) . Similarly, sectoral loan concentration in Greece is marked, as it is in many EE countries. Even more significantly, the interest rate spread in Greece is especially wide, indicating the transfer of high intermediation costs to borrowers through high lending rates. Also, high PSBR make for a strong crowding-out effect on private investment in the Greek case, as in that of many EE countries. Lastly, banks prefer short-term lending in Greece, as they do in EE countries.
It is similarities such as the above that make the comparison between Greece and the EE countries in terms of bank reform interesting, as well as potentially useful. So far Greece has opted for a decentralised, gradualist approach to bank restructuring. This is a politically and socially more tolerable way to restructure, albeit more costly as the Hungarian and Polish experiences have shown. Whether the trade-off will pay and to what extent remains to be seen.
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